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The future wireless communication network (5G and beyond) is expected
to provide many advantages, such as an extremely high peak rate, ultralow
latency and less energy consumption. However, since an extremely large
number of connecting devices will be deployed, the demand for the spec-
trum will also be growing exponentially, causing a problem of spectrum
shortage. To effectively address the spectrum crunch, dynamic spectrum
access (DSA), including both sensing-based and database-driven DSA, has
been proposed.
In this thesis, we investigate critical challenges in DSA, including the
efficiency in sensing-based techniques and privacy in database-driven tech-
niques. First, to improve the sensing performance of the sensing-based DSA
in half-duplex (HD) systems, we propose two sensing approaches leveraging
the property of deep learning networks. Our solutions are significantly
superior in terms of the robustness to noise uncertainty, timing delay, and
carrier frequency offset (CFO), compared to conventional sensing methods.
Moreover, our work does not require any prior information of signals, which
however is essential for the traditional sensing methods. Second, to improve
the sensing performance of sensing-based DSA in full-duplex (FD) systems,
we develop two novel sensing methods using the features of orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) signals. The developed sensing
approaches are robust to not only residual SI but also timing delay or CFO.
We also obtain the closed-form expressions of the probability of detection
and false alarm for our approaches. Third, to protect the users’ privacy in

the database-driven DSA, we develop two schemes to protect the operational
privacy of Incumbent Users (IUs) and honest/dishonest Secondary Users
(SUs). To implement our proposed work, we introduce an interference
calculation scheme that allows users to calculate an interference budget
without revealing operational information. It also reduces the computing
overhead of our developed approaches. Additionally, we propose a “pun-
ishment and forgiveness mechanism to encourage dishonest SUs to provide
truthful information. Theoretical analysis and extensive simulations show
that our proposed schemes can better protect all users’ operational privacy
under various privacy attacks, yielding higher spectrum utilization with less
online overhead, compared with state of the art approaches.
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